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Introduction
Old Barriers, New Openings
Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode
The inspiration for this collection is straightforward. “Study problems, not
periods,” Lord Acton advised; yet the 1980s – whether or not these years
mark a distinct period – pose a significant problem for contemporary
historians because of the rapidity of so many momentous changes in the
world. The history of these years has only just begun to be examined,
and for many scholars, it centers on a return to the high politics of the
ColdWar: the years between 1979 and 1989 saw a heightening of military
tension between the superpowers, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979 and the reinvigoration of conflicts across Latin America and
Africa, reaching its worst point around 1983. This was followed by so
dramatic a reduction in hostilities that contemporaries would declare the
Cold War over by the end of the decade.
The effects of this change were particularly dramatic in and for Europe.
Indeed, 1989 has entered the canon of international history with dates
such as 1648, 1815, and 1914 as one of Europe’s major turning points.
Germany would soon be reunified, the Soviet Union dismantled, and
Europe, in U.S. president George H. W. Bush’s popular phrase, could
become “whole and free.”1 This narrative, tilted heavily toward the very
end of the decade, has overlooked or underplayed nearly every other event
from the onset of détente in the 1970s to the wars of Yugoslav succession.2
1 Speech in Mainz, May 31, 1989; see http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6–890531.htm (last
accessed October 1, 2012).
2 See, inter alia, John Lewis Gaddis,We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998); Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold
War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., The Fall of
1
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To many Europeans, the 1980s tell a different story. The year 1989was
a dramatic moment, to be sure, albeit one that few people predicted to the
hour. Perhaps more significant in retrospect were the vastly different
reactions to it throughout Europe. The Central European experience of
1989was not shared uniformly by all Europeans, or even uniformly within
Central Europe, least of all within Germany. This point, whichwould seem
to be obvious to any historian writing about any major world event,
remains contested within the historiography of this decade.3
The picture is not any clearer at its putative beginning. For all that the
so-called second Cold War (ca. 1979–85) was an important development
in the lives of many people in Europe – at its nadir around 1983 – it did not
predetermine every aspect of the dramatic transformation that followed.
For one thing, Europe and European concerns had ceased to be at the
center of the world – or even, for that matter, of the Cold War – by the
1970s. Although the revolutions of 1989 dominated headlines then and
since, they did not alter this reality, nor did they occur independently from
globalization, which may have had as much to do with bringing about the
revolutions in 1989 than any single sequence of political negotiations
within or over Europe. The shape of Europe at the end of the century
was not prescribed fully by the end of the Cold War, whenever and
wherever it began. There was more to the story.4
Another important element, of course, was the long-evolving process of
European integration. Whether and to what degree the putative end of the
ColdWar in Europe – or, alternatively, its acceleration a few years earlier –
breathed new life into that process is open to debate. Both its power over
nation-states and its territorial reach had grown consistently since the
1950s. The 1980s alone saw the European Community welcome Greece,
Spain, and Portugal as new member states well before opening its doors to
the nations of the former Communist bloc. When this took place formally
in 2004, a reunited Germany was already more than a decade old, with the
the Berlin Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); the special issue of the Journal of
Contemporary History, “Revisiting 1989: Causes, Course and Consequences,” (August
2009); Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., Europe
and the End of the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2008); Andreas Rödder, Deutschland,
einig Vaterland: Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Beck, 2009).
3 One of the earliest attempts at grappling with the variations is Timothy Garton Ash, In
Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Cape, 1993).
4 See, e.g., Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the
Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and the chapters in
Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., The Shock of the
Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
2 European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s
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former GDR having become part of not only the Federal Republic but also
the EC in 1990. Another decade earlier, in 1980, the Community signed
its first trade agreement with a Comecon member, Romania.5And in 1986
came the Single European Act (SEA), which set into motion the process
leading to the Maastricht Treaty six years later and the formal establish-
ment of the European Union.
This enumeration of events epitomizes a basic fact about the integration
project: enlargement not only reinforced the Community’s economic and
demographic potential, but also demonstrated the new political role it had
acquired, or aimed to acquire, by the 1980s. In all three Mediterranean
countries, EC membership helped stabilize the young democratic system
and was accompanied by a new focus on human rights and democratiza-
tion, in and beyond Western Europe.6 What perhaps looked like a
late glimmering of Wilsonianism was indeed an expression of a new
European idea, reinforced by actors such as the European Parliament
with its more self-assertive role since the introduction of direct elections
in 1979. Moreover, the SEA and even more the Maastricht Treaty dem-
onstrated that the integration was moving incrementally beyond its focus
on the economy and now increasingly included competences in fields as
diverse as the environment, energy, home affairs, and culture.7
None of this happened in a vacuum; but neither did the end of the Cold
War. To establish how best to connect the multiple narratives of and about
Europe during these years is the central aim of this volume. Specifically, it
weaves a transatlantic, Cold War perspective into the standard narrative
of European integration – and vice versa. Why did European integration
take so big a stride forward at the precise moment of greatest hostility
between the superpowers? Is it possible to show that one set of tensions led
to progress in mitigating or reversing another? Were the two trajectories
essentially reinforcing, or independent? And where did the United
States – and, broadly speaking, transatlantic relations – fit in the
European story?How does the European integration narrative flowwithin
5 David Kennedy and David E. Webb, “Integration: Eastern Europe and the European
Communities,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 28 (1990), 633–75; Suvi Kansikas,
Trade Blocs and the Cold War: The CMEA and the EC Challenge, 1969–1976 (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Helsinki, 2012).
6 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2010).
7 N. Piers Ludlow, “European Integration in the 1980s: On theWay toMaastricht?” Journal
of European Integration History, 19 (2013).
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the wider framework of an Atlantic Community?8Was this a case of benign
U.S. neglect? Or were there important, albeit indirect and perhaps even
unrecognized, steps taken by Americans that facilitated the deepening, and
paved the way for the later widening, of European institutions and gover-
nance? What does the relative paucity of European discourse in the United
States during the early andmiddle 1980s – in contrast with earlier moments
of high global tension, namely the late 1940s, mid-late 1950s, and early
1960s – suggest about the nature of the years leading up to 1989, and those
that followed? Might the U.S. government have devoted more attention in
public to nonmilitary issues like trade, the environment, and monetary
policy earlier in the decade? And how did European attitudes toward the
United States –which also reached new lows in the early part of the decade –
affect those priorities? Were transatlantic scars still too raw to reopen from
the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, which saw some disputes over market
access and energy policy grow nearly as bitter for some people as those
over life and death in Vietnam? These are just a few of the questions raised
by the chapters in this volume. Its overall aim in suggesting answers to them
is to establish and advance an agenda for research on the decade, loosely
demarcated.
scope, orientation, and coverage
The first task for the study of any historical period is to address its
chronology. It includes when the decade began, when it ended, how it
compares to earlier periods, and even whether the usual ten-year demarca-
tionmakes historical sense. As already suggested, the 1980s may bemore of
a “non-decade” or “long decade” than one would otherwise gather from
the calendar. Recent research on the 1970s, for example, suggests that it was
hardly the “dark ages” of European integration that most contemporaries
and an earlier wave of research thought it to be.9Yet, according toMatthias
8 For precedents, see Valérie Aubourg, Gérard Bossuat, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds.,
European Community, Atlantic Community? (Paris: Soleb, 2008); Giles Scott-Smith and
Valérie Aubourg, eds., Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America? (Paris: Soleb, 2011).
9 Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,”
in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community:
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 1–39, here 8;
as a contemporary example, see Sicco Mansholt, La Crise (Paris: Stock, 1974); one of the
earliest, more positive reassessments of the decade is JosephH. H.Weiler, The Constitution
of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 39–63; for more recent work
by historians, see, e.g., Antonio Varsori and GuiaMigani, eds., Europe in the International
Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011).
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Schulz and Thomas Schwartz, the 1970s was the first decade in which
European integration was acknowledged as an impediment to transatlantic
relations: the United States continued to support the former rhetorically
but did little to encourage or help it in practice, which had not been the case
during the 1950s and early 1960s.10 Others like Geir Lundestad have gone
even further to characterize U.S. support for, and interest in, European
integration between 1977 and 1984 as going “from bad to worse.”11
The term “Eurosclerosis,” coined in the 1980s to characterize the decade
starting in themid-1970s,may suffer a similar divided fate as researchmoves
further into the 1980s. Instead, some have argued that the Community
experienced “a sequence of irregular big bangs” during the years from
1973 to 1986, while others have disaggregated these years into even smaller
units.12 Obviously, distinct policy fields had different trajectories – for
instance, with theCommonAgricultural Policy being a problem child during
most of the decade, whereas the Common Fishery Policy, the direct elections
of the European Parliament, or the first Schengen Agreement on border
controls signified new steps and modes of integration. Its pace and effects
varied much from place to place, as they had always done. At the formal
level, the 1980s saw considerable movement: on the one hand, three new
countries joined the EC, but on the other, Greenland became the first and (so
far) only country ever to leave the Community. Such variations mattered,
and continue tomatter. They are also a sharp reminder against any simplistic
and teleological narratives of European integration.13 Yet it should still be
possible to stand back and address the most important turning points and
continuities.
Contending periodizations have produced different verdicts of achieve-
ment and failure. For this reason, we propose extending both the
10 Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, “The Superpower and the Union in theMaking:
U.S.-European Relations, 1969–1980,” in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, eds.,
The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 355–73.
11 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by
Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 201.
12 See, e.g., Peter Katzenstein, “International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change,”
in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical
Challenges (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 296; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of
Europe since 1945 (NewYork: Penguin, 2005), 526; DesmondDinan,Ever Closer Union:
An Introduction to European Integration, 4th edition (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010).
13 On this problem, also see, e.g., Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori, eds., European Union
History: Themes and Debates (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010); Mark Gilbert, “Narrating the
Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,” Journal of Common
Market Studies 46 (2008), 641–62.
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chronological and geographic scope of the decade and its topical param-
eters from the heretofore narrow and separate discussions of security or
economic integration to national, regional, and global culture and the
elaboration of each in the presence of the other. That is to say, by address-
ing the Atlantic and European dimensions of politics, economics, and
society together, we may rediscover what many people probably under-
stood at the time: the transatlantic narrative had one logic and hierarchy,
with geopolitics at the top, while the European integration narrative had
another that was defined by the language of center and periphery. But
neither one could escape the other.
The chapters in this volume thus do more than blur the standard
chronology. They also claim that, when seen in their interrelated totality,
the transatlantic and European narratives accomplish something remark-
able for one another during these years. Transatlantic relations improved
dramatically, which helped further (again, indirectly) some real achieve-
ments in European integration insofar as Americans neither stood in the
way nor gave the impression that hand-holding was needed or wanted.
In other words, there was the semblance of a rise in sovereignty – for the
Atlantic Alliance, which was no longer held hostage to intramural battles
over codfish, grain, pipelines, or missiles; for the European Community,
which was no longer expected to submit to the blessing or approval of
non-Europeans; and for the members of the soon-to-be-former Soviet
bloc, which was no longer so fearful of Soviet power and therefore could
finally contemplate choosing a different set of European and transatlantic
alignments.
All this was imagined and executed during a very short period of time
in themid-1980s, and ironically, soon after contemporaries said things could
not get any worse for the West. For not only did the global basis of trans-
atlantic relations continue to shift from a superpower duopoly to a more
multipolar arrangement, but so did subjects like energy, the environment,
and human rights continue to reappear in transnational fora.14 Even within
Europe, there was a shift away from bipolarity as European governments
(no longer just De Gaulle’s France) took independent positions from
the United States, for example, over the boycott of the 1980 Moscow
14 E.g., RobertO.Keohane and JosephNye,Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown,
1977); Bruce Mazlish, The New Global History (London: Routledge, 2006); chapters by
Niall Ferguson and Charles Maier in Shock of the Global; Franz Knipping and
Matthias Schönwald, eds., Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische
Einigung 1969–1984 (Trier: WVT, 2004); Antonio Varsori, ed., Alle origini del presente.
L’Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2007).
6 European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s
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Olympics; the imposition of an embargo on Soviet grain; the construction
of a Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe; and on the trade and
other disputes following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. None of
these disputes was fatal to the Alliance, as the following chapters address,
both separately and cumulatively; in fact, as some scholars have even
argued about earlier challenges to U.S. hegemony, they may even have
strengthened it.15
The transformation of relationships in and between Europe and the
United States must be understood in a global context. World merchandise
trade more than tripled between 1973 and 1983 – from $578 billion to
$1,835 billion. In 1993, it stood at $3,639 billion.16 Between 1978 and
1985, the number of intergovernmental organizations (IOs) jumped from
290 to 380, and the number of international NGOs from 2,400 to 4,700.17
The number of IOs as well as of NGOs experienced the fastest growth
of any time since 1945. In sum, the world, especially the Atlantic world,
was more closely connected than ever, while at the same time, Japan was
perceived as both a political and strategic asset and as a real economic
threat, while several other important economic actors in Asia emerged.
The West was a beneficiary of globalization, but also now one of several
contenders for global preeminence.
It is within this context that the so-called secondColdWar – the collapse
and replacement of superpower détente – occurred alongside the acceler-
ation of European integration leading to the SEA. Each took place amid
a transformation of global politics and society away from the bipolar
order that had begun to compete, even within Europe, with alternative
concepts, eventually including the “European common home” later
championed by Mikhail Gorbachev. This concept – a Soviet rendition of
the pan-Europeanism from the interwar period, which placed all European
nations, including Russia and its fellow members of the Soviet bloc, into a
single, regional idea – did not come suddenly into existence, but rather
emerged over time, andwith considerable variations across the Soviet bloc,
as Europe’s own position in the world began to supersede East-West
divisions over the course of the 1970s. This context helps explain why
the second Cold War did not look perfectly like a replay of the late 1940s
15 See Michael Creswell, AQuestion of Balance: How France and the United States Created
Cold War Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
16 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2000 (Geneva: WTO Publications,
2000), 28.
17 Yearbook of International Organizations, 1909–1999, table 2, online version: http://
www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php (last accessed on October 1, 2012).
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and early 1950s: while those years put Europe back on the center stage of
world politics, themost recent literature reveals that the continent’s eastern
and western parts still managed to decouple themselves to a surprising
extent from this simple formulation.18 A few years later, Gorbachev
depicted Western Europe as his partner in reform, impressed, as he put it,
by the EC as a “new giant developing one with a population of 350million
people, which surpasses us in its level of economic, scientific and techno-
logical growth.”19
If the last generation of Soviet rulers – and even more than them the
intellectual elites of East-Central Europe – really did regard Europe and
“Europeanness” as a positive orientation because of the perceived promise
of closer relations with the European Community, the perception would,
in effect, flip the Cold War pattern of causation on its head. It would mean
that the progress of European integration of the mid-late 1980s, rather
than being one of several results of the end of the Cold War, was in effect
one of its primary stimuli, while at the same time, the role of the European
Community in ending the Cold War – if only because of Gorbachev’s
views of it – was more important than most accounts have allowed. As
the chapters by Piers Ludlow, Antonio Varsori, Angela Romano, and
Philipp Gassert demonstrate, borders between conditions, causes, and
consequences blur considerably by the middle of the decade, so much
that a Panglossian interpretation of the entire period may present a strong
temptation for authors of the grand narrative. In assigning subjects and
scholars we tried our best to resist it. Indeed the various chapters differ
on several points: for example, on the main thrust and import of peace
18 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), chapters 1 and 2; and Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and
Vladislav Zubok, Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe,
1989 (New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 18ff, 492–96, 641–43; Marie-
Pierre Rey, “‘Europe Is Our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic
Concept,” Cold War History 4 (2004), 33–65; and, by the same author, “Perestroika and
Its Effects Revisited: Gorbachev’s New Thinking and Europe, 1985–89,” in Bozo, Rey, and
Nuti, Europe and the End of the Cold War; José M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulińska-Jurgiel, and
Christian Domnitz, eds., Europa im Ostblock. Vorstellungen und Diskurse (1945–1991)
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2008); Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the
Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997);
Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain: European
Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985 (Copenhagen: Museum
Tusculanum Press, 2010).
19 Gorbachev at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw on July 15, 1988,
published in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside
History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991 (New York: Central European University Press,
2005), 608.
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movements on either side of the Atlantic vis-à-vis nuclear arms control
and disarmament; the causal relationships between economic and polit-
ical trends; the degree to which both were mediated by globalization, or
more by internal (i.e., European) factors; the relative influence of second-
tier states like Italy or Poland in advancing a wider process of historical
change; and, ultimately, the structural, or stochastic, character of such
change in the late twentieth century or, as several chapters suggest, a series
of challenge and response cycles that recall the theories of Arnold Toynbee.
The possibility of considering these and related questions is just one of the
advantages of reconstructing the intertwined histories of Europe during this
period from the inside out rather than derivatively from the outside in, or the
top down.
Within Western Europe there was an effort to extend economic and
political integration and to bolsterWesternmilitary and economic strength
beyond it. This took place, as Angela Romano describes, while the allies
simultaneously advanced their opening to the East by way of the CSCE
process with follow-on conferences to the 1975meeting that produced the
Helsinki Final Act, their associated Helsinki Watch Groups and related
activities that sought to protect and promote human rights. European
integration gained traction, we argue, precisely because of the perceived
need to present an image of strength, not only to “other” Europeans (that
is, in the Soviet bloc) whose rhetoric had come to equate reform in their
countries with the wider coming together of Europe, but also to Americans,
who regularly demanded a commitment to the same Helsinki process
throughout Europe, particularly in these countries, as well as to some
Western Europeans who, rightly or wrongly, questioned policies put for-
ward by the United States.
That did not happen uniformly, to be sure: the chapters by Frédéric
Bozo and Antonio Varsori, for example, illustrate important distinctions
later on in French and Italian approaches. Images of what Europe could,
and should, be continued to diverge throughout the long decade.However,
this preliminary survey of the 1980s suggests that the deepening and
widening of the transatlantic and European processes of integration
were permeable inasmuch as they played off their mutual strengths, as
well as the specter of mutual dilution. This does not necessarily mean that
each was consistently present in the thought and action of most people
on both sides of the Atlantic; the Polish crisis from 1980–81, for example,
reveals, in Robert Brier’s chapter, that the language of Western unity
differed from place to place but rarely took into account the EC per se,
whereas Romano demonstrates the indirect effect such differences had
Introduction 9
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on European cohesion within the framework of the 1980–83 Madrid
follow-on meeting of the CSCE. In these instances, the need to stand
together for the purpose of gaining Soviet concessions on human rights
for the most part overrode transatlantic disputes over the best approach to
take, which, in turn, allowed the NATO caucus in Europe to encourage
unity among EC members in this and similar forums.
On the domestic level, the complexities of each story present an unpredict-
able yet logical pattern of causation from moment to moment, as well
as transitively: for example, in noting Brier’s description of the similarities
between Poland andChile; or in recalling how important the Falkland Islands
conflict was to Thatcher’s political career, and how critical Thatcher sub-
sequently was to making Gorbachev acceptable toWestern skeptics, leads us
to wonder whether a Chilean dictator or an Argentine junta was indirectly
responsible for the peaceful end of the Cold War, however tendentious that
may sound. Or in highlighting, as several authors do, that the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative prompted much collective soul-searching in Europe and,
apart fromwhatever effects it may have had on Soviet calculations, evidently
reinvigorated the drive for integration in Western Europe. It may also be
possible, therefore, to draw an admittedly circuitous line of causation
between the SDI and the SEA. This was, as historians like to say, a very
pregnant decade. When considered cumulatively and in light of fluctuating
politics in each major country, as the chapters in this volume also describe,
the two European narratives become nearly impossible to separate, and in
fact appear to attract one another as would the force between the two poles
of a magnet.
How and when did they come together? There were two phases, with
the first having begun around 1977, lasting through the end of 1986, and
then another one following from 1987 to 1992. The chapters of this book
follow along this chronology. The first phase featured a reactive, even
defensive, stance on both sides of the Atlantic vis-à-vis national and
regional interests amid worsening global tensions, but it was neither new
nor clear-cut. One recalls that the early 1970s brought the first enlarge-
ment of the EC and the reorientation of the United Kingdom, not necessa-
rily away from the Atlantic, but toward a more composite position that
sought to harmonize both transatlantic and European interests. That
compromise survived and, arguably, thrived, as Western governments
moved to recover from their mid-decade crisis over monetary and energy
policies with important successes, particularly after 1975: the establish-
ment of a post–Bretton Woods system for the coordination of monetary
policy; the advent of a global human rights agenda within the framework
10 European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s
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of détente; the rethinking of relationships between the developed and under-
developed worlds; and the further entry of transnational, global issues
like the environment and energy into the realm of high politics, all during
a period when personal relationships between leaders on either side of
the Atlantic (e.g., Henry Kissinger–Michel Jobert; Jimmy Carter–Helmut
Schmidt) appeared dismal.
The Iranian hostage crisis, the declaration of martial law in Poland, the
Soviet grain embargo, and the FalklandsWar brought them even further to
the fore. Yet, as Gassert’s and Varsori’s chapters show in detail, NATO’s
1979 dual-track decision and its implementation – resulting in the
Euromissile deployments and then their subsequent elimination by treaty
in 1987 – offset the difficulties and, to some extent, liberated negotiations
in other areas while at the same time even forcing a reexamination – some
of it collaborative and complementary – among the many groups opposing
the deployments.
Meanwhile, by the mid-1980s, Europe – that is to say, the European
project – again became fashionable, even in the United States.20 But it was
a particular Europe, with multiple identities acting in parallel. For some in
the United States, as Mark Gilbert’s chapter illustrates, it was a Europe
that harkened back to the 1940s and 1950s and ahead to an ideal future –
the center of action, the critical ally, the favored field of battle in the war of
human progress. In much of Western Europe, it remained an integrating
entity and a glass half empty, whereas in the East it was a bit of both. In
all three regions there was, according to Gilbert, a shift in the character or
essence of the question that seemed, at least then, to overtake the so-called
structural constraints of previous decades, notably the one that set
Atlanticism and Europeanism against one another as mutually exclusive
policy orientations or visions. Seen in retrospect, that apparent dialectic
had mostly to do with the moving contours of Germany and its dual status
within postwar Europe, and less with the inherent meaning or value of
either orientation.21 By about 1986, or, as Bozo’s chapter concludes, cer-
tainly by 1992, it was no longer the case that European integration – either
within Western Europe or across the East-West divide – had to happen at
the expense of transatlantic solidarity, or vice versa. Three rounds of EC
20 Not least among social scientists who, in the 1980s, returned to European studies with
renewed interest in functionalism, “constructivism,” and related topics of the economic and
political dimensions of regional integration. This interest also coincidedwith the emphasis of
scholars like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, on questions of
institutional governance and interdependence.
21 Cf. Schulz in Schulz and Schwartz, The Strained Alliance, 307.
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enlargement, for which old alliances such as in the case of Britain (1973)
and security concerns in the cases of Spain and Portugal (1981) as well as
of Greece (1986) loomed large, are probably the best evidence for this
new dynamic and also for the greater heterogeneity that now characterized
the integration project. An Atlantic Europe could coexist with a Federal
Europe, even with a Gaullist Europe. In other words, multiple Europes
became fashionable during a time when the awareness and acceptance of
multiple channels of intergovernmental action grew, thanks not only to such
processes within Europe but also to the nascent G-7 and similar arrange-
ments throughout the developedworld. That the effect of suchmultiplicities
converged in the mid-1980s was not entirely accidental; nor was it entirely
planned.22
The second half of the decade, roughly from 1987 to 1992, saw the
EC finally make the leap from an intergovernmental body to a small but
credible world actor. The United States meanwhile appeared to renew its
commitment to European integration, reversing some earlier setbacks. To
be sure, the extent to which the post-1986 period was a conscious reaction
to the period before varied by sector and country, but on balance, this
periodization best evokes the interrelationship of the transatlantic and
European narratives on the one hand and of historical causation in both
directions – before and after 1986 – on the other.23
the longer view
To begin to understand this story requires a deeper examination of the
sources of European Policy during the 1980s: the personalities, economic
and social conditions, political realignments, shifting moods and attitudes,
and, perhaps above all, the congruence of popular axioms amid the depar-
ture of an elite generation and its replacement by another in the wider
regional, global, historical, and intellectual contexts. For while there were
major differences in the 1970s over the ends of policy – within the West,
22 Cf. Kiran Klaus Patel, “Provincializing the European Communities: Cooperation and
Integration in Europe in aHistorical Perspective,”ContemporaryEuropeanHistory22 (2013).
23 E.g., see, also with a focus on 1975 to 1985, Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann
Wentker, “Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Einleitende Überlegungen
zum historischen Ort des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses von 1979,” in Philipp Gassert,
Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker, eds., Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung:
Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), 13; Geir Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis? The
United States and Europe since 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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between theWest and the East, and even between the North and the South –
as noted in the chapter by Antonio Varsori – most of these disappeared by
the later 1980s or were replaced by differences over means.24
Looking ahead, several chapters also compel the question of why so
many achievements were followed by so much discord. Was the old
Atlantic-European dialectic buried too hastily? Or are cultural differences
just too endemic? This kind of quasi-biological historicism has proved
popular in the writings of polemicists like Robert Kagan, as it had before
him with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and others.25 It is true that many
Americans and Europeans remain geopolitically and culturally ambivalent;
Donald Rumsfeld was neither the first nor the only public figure to tout
the existence of an Old World/New World dichotomy. At one level both
Americans and Europeans appear to recognize the continued interpenetra-
tion of one another’s societies, although it must be admitted that this is
much more palpable now in Europe. At another level, there are too many
distinctions to enumerate, and increasingly, again because of globalization,
it is much harder to assert that Americans and Europeans (and
their interests) are any more alike and aligned than, say, Americans and
Japanese, Mexicans, or Australians. Of course Europeans themselves con-
tinue to discuss their own place in the world with endless determination.
Americans increasingly have begun to do the same thing, as the late Samuel
Huntington’s final book – Who Are We? – well attests.26
Atlanticism and Europeanism were each born of the apparent desire of
some Europeans and Americans to have two balls in the air at once: some
wanted to stress solidarity yet at the same time to assert difference; others
wanted to recognize a state of interdependence while also championing
self-determination. Atlanticism and Europeanism have always coexisted
and competed with one another, and with their respective paradoxes.
24 Cf. Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt,
Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008).
25 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order
(NewYork: Knopf, 2003). Cf. Alan K. Henrikson, “Why the United States and Europe See
the World Differently: An Atlanticist’s Rejoinder to the Kagan Thesis,” EUSA Review
(2003), 1–10; Christopher J. Makins, “Power andWeakness, or Challenge and Response?
Reflections on the Kagan Thesis,” unpublished paper, Atlantic Council of the U.S. (2003);
StevenWalt, “The Ties that Fray:Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart,”National
Interest 54 (1998/1999), 3–11; and Ulrich Krotz, “The (Beginning of the) End of the
Political Unity of the West? Four Scenarios of North Atlantic Futures,” RSCAS Working
Paper 2008/31.
26 Simon & Schuster, 2004.
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Who were the principal Atlanticists and who were the Europeanists?
This question also is more complex than it appears. Too often, historians
make the mistake of tracing a policy trajectory by way of the statements
and presumed thoughts of the few people at the top. But there were other
important players. In the U.S. State andDefense departments, for example,
Atlanticists still held sway over policy during the 1980s. Almost none were
Gaullists to the extent Kissinger, Nixon, and Brzezinski could be painted
as having been. Men like Horst Teltschik in the Federal Republic, Charles
Powell in theUnitedKingdom, Brent Scowcroft in the United States, Jacques
Attali in France, Jacques Delors in Brussels, and Anatoly Chernyaev in
the Soviet Union came, by the very end of the decade and in the early
1990s, to establish their own transatlantic policy network, much as their
predecessors had done a generation before. Where they were unable to
smooth the edges of politics, civic groups were needed to fill the gap and
bring continuity – as Giles Scott-Smith’s chapter describes – often in
response to the opposition led by the groups described in Philipp Gassert’s
and Holger Nehring’s chapters. Therefore, to tell this story, one also must
extend its coverage vertically, so to speak, to include many more protago-
nists and antagonists, as well as horizontally, over time.
Tracing the ebb and flowof policy networks is just oneway to understand
the importance of cross-cutting transnational alliances among bureaucrats
and pressure groups and, not insignificantly, economic policy makers and
business lobbies, as the chapters by Duccio Basosi, Ksenia Demidova, and
Arthe Van Laer illustrate. Collaborative relationships and rivalries among
these groups led in most cases to a borrowing and a blurring of policy
models – seen especially in Basosi’s chapter –whereby Europeans fashioned
an unwieldy combination of acquiescence to – and in some places, even
praise for – Reaganism’s microeconomics with deep criticism of its macro-
economics and its effects on Europe. Jacques Delors’s trajectory from wit-
nessingMitterrand’s failed experiment of Socialist economic policy between
1981 and 1983 to sweeping up the pieces as minister of the economy and
of finance in France and later on putting the European Community on a
more neoliberal track is one of the better examples. Similar paths were
followed in many other areas as well, from popular music and film to the
academic disciplines. The extent to which these convergences mediated and
conditioned high politics has only just begun to be understood.
Policy history meanwhile has only so much explanatory value.
Bureaucracies are known to give priority to some areas that may turn
out to be less salient over time; and the interests of bureaucracies may
not match perfectly with the aims they claim to pursue. Determining the
14 European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s
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fate of policies therefore comes down to much more than the relative prom-
inence of its promoters and detractors. In this instance, most Atlanticists
and Europeanists would have said that their general goals were consistent:
peace, prosperity, and successful integration of Europe, first of the West,
then of the East. Yet one set of goals and actors did not guarantee fulfillment
by the other. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, or a powerful
European Union, could have brought about an end to the Cold War, or the
unification of Europe, on its own.
These rather obvious qualifications take us back to the role of leaders
and leadership. We may extend the speculation, as several chapters do in
this book, back further to argue that some like Kohl and Mitterrand
drew inspiration from the Monnet method and example, not only in its
passion and commitment to European unity but also and perhaps even
more consistently to transatlantic partnership, alternately strengthening
their own European “pillar” and persuading like-minded Americans to
support it.27 Delors was known to share many of these views, and was
portrayed in the United States, as we learn from Mark Gilbert, as a latter-
day Monnet. By and large, the United States under Reagan and especially
with George H. W. Bush returned during this period to the axiom of
Europe as a unifying project. In Europe, this augmented the effort led
by Kohl and Mitterrand to lay a European basis for German unification
by ensuring that a unified Germany would play a constructive role in
European institutions. Bush and Kohl in turn helped ensure a similar result
in transatlantic institutions. Both efforts built upon the earlier work of
Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher – who again had been the first major
Western leader to bestow her endorsement upon the Soviet leader – to end
the Cold War peaceably. If the history of this decade suggests anything
about there having been some kind of broad, strategic dialectic in Europe,
it existed both between the continent’s eastern and western centers of
gravity, and between rival geopolitical visions within each bloc.
Atlanticism and European integration came to resemble more symbiotic
than contending doctrines. This does not necessarily mean their rivalry
was not significant. But it was not, and never really was, mutually exclu-
sive. It would appear impossible for two distinct policy maps to exist
simultaneously in the real world; but in this case, and during this decade,
especially, there did.
27 A central argument of Frédéric Bozo’s book, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and
German Reunification. trans. Susan Emanuel (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
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envoi
The discussion in the chapters that follow centers on the question of con-
vergence, both among various ideas and images of Europe, and between
those ideas and events on the ground. They do not all agree on causes and
effects, or even on the same chronologies. Thus, while their coverage varies –
and is meant to be selectively comparative rather than exhaustive – the
aim of each chapter is to draw the various strands of the decade’s history
together while planting the seeds of future scholarship. Archives with
sources for these years have just begun to open; students are gravitating
toward them, and the entire decade is finally being treated with some
measure of objective distance. We are still at the beginning – the very
beginning – of a long and rich path of discovery. Accordingly, our bias
has been in favor of adding – both years and nuance – over subtracting.
We plot a course for others to follow with the aim, as the selection of
authors and topics reveals, of extending historical European integration
research into a new decade, of broadening the discussion of European
international history in the 1980s from its heavy focus on the very end – in
fact, the final year – of the decade, and of enriching Anglo-American
historiography of the Cold War with more perspectives from Europe.28
By integrating the transatlantic dimension of European integration and
Europe’s role in the transatlantic relationship as best as sources will
currently allow, we hope this portion of the international history of the
last years of the twentieth century will not only resemble a Rubik’s cube –
invented, incidentally, in 1974 and first sold on the market in 1980 – but
also a finely woven fabric of silk and iron.
28 Cf. Michael Cox, “Another Transatlantic Split? American and European Narratives and
the End of the Cold War,” Cold War History 7 (2007), 121–46.
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